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and onset of the “cold war,” many soldiers and surgeons had not expected another “bullet and bayonet scrap,” (161) and distain for medics had re-emerged. The build up to the Falklands war (April 2 to June 14, 1982) began to rapidly change this. First aid provision amongst the parachute regiment and commando brigade deploying to the south Atlantic was poor. Training and discussion on the way to the Falklands undoubtedly saved many lives on the Battle field.

Chapters 9–11 tell of the experiences of the Falklands war and the difficulties of the unusual doctor–patient relationships seen on the battle-field. Friends who the doctor has known often for some time—friends he has trained and socialised with—now suddenly became his patients. The doctor sees the full horror of warfare but has little or no release for his emotions, the combat troops are able to show controlled aggression towards the enemy who has inflicted such injuries upon his friend; not so the doctor. The Falklands war came after a period of stagnation and the experiences gained and problems faced lead to a rethinking of medical planning and provision throughout the army. These lessons proved to be of great benefit in the future campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Chapter 12 is a little disappointing as the accounts of peace keeping in the Balkans do not begin until Kosovo in 1999. For some years prior to this there had been a UN presence in the former Yugoslavia.

Overall, this book is most enjoyable, informative, and readable. Here and there, there are a few errors such as “tibula” or 2 PARA (2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment) rather than 3 PARA (3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment), but these errors do nothing to distract from the overall high quality of this book. For anyone who has an interest in military medicine or history this book will be of great interest and enjoyment.

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ALFRED I. TAUBER. *Science and the Quest for Meaning*. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2009. \$29.95.

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Science and the Quest for Meaning, by Alfred Tauber, attempts to define a peace treaty in the Science Wars which have dominated much of the philosophical world in the past two decades. For those not familiar with that debate, the longstanding tension between two philosophical camps,

which used to be called modernism and postmodernism, reached a crisis point when physicist Alan Sokal succeeded at publishing a nonsensical article in a peer-reviewed postmodernist-oriented journal. Sokal then went around the country giving talks about the silliness of postmodernists, and of course many of them responded with vitriol, leading to counter-attacks, etc. Sokal's derision, like that of many of my colleagues in science, was directed at those who claimed that all scientific knowledge is optional, and for all we know, ancient Babylonian astrology was better. Books such as *Higher Superstition*, by Paul Gross and Norman Leavitt, *Fashionable Nonsense*, by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, and *A House Built on Sand*, by Noretta Koertge, have documented some of what scientists find ridiculous. And as Tauber notes, scientists have the upper hand: they have created airplanes, electricity, satellites, and the Internet, while post-modern philosophers have created a few impenetrable articles and maybe a couple of good poems.

Yet postmodern thinking has some good points, and most scientists I know today acknowledge this. Not many scientists today think we are always "neutral"—we go into the lab looking for something that we want to see. Most also agree that scientists themselves are legitimate topics of sociological study. Most scientists agree that there is still a place for "large concepts" like beauty and wonder, and they like to walk under the moon or in the deep forest as much as anyone else. What scientists insist on is, first of all, that there really is a world "out there" that cannot be constructed just any old way we want, and second, that the scientific endeavor has self-correction mechanisms that eventually undo abuses that can arise from non-neutral scientists or dominant paradigms. Even the sociological study of scientists follows scientific rules. Tauber's discussion of sociological studies of scientists is ironic, because it implicitly sets the sociologists in exactly the same position as the one they claimed to critique: the position of objective, impartial observation of scientists. Thus, the really useful critiques of science are actually self-corrections, coming from people working with a scientific mentality.

Tauber gives the impression that the academic Science Wars are largely over, and perhaps he is right. One telling fact is that Tauber rarely uses the terms "modernist" and "postmodernist"; instead he prefers the terms "positivist" and "postpositivist." Does Tauber's avoidance of the term indicate that "postmodernism" is now a dirty word? If so, it would indicate that at least some of the criticism of postmodernism has hit home, and a retreat to a less extreme position has occurred.

Tauber presents a moderated position aimed at making peace. He rejects extreme relativism, and accepts that modern science is, in fact, better than that of ancient pagans; progress does happen, and airplanes are

real. His program is a rediscovery of both Thoreau and Dewey: romanticism and pragmatism. The romantics provide us with poetic and analogical thinking: the big picture of beauty and meaning instead of just lists of details. Dewey's pragmatism allows science to talk of value and morality in terms of what works best for society. The inclusion of Dewey as a hero in what is overall a postmodern view is somewhat surprising, because Dewey was no friend of romantics. Dewey's program of morality was pure scientific hegemony: science would eventually resolve all questions of morality by objective measurements, bypassing all old notions of religion and meaning and displacing all theologians, classicalists, and philosophers. Dewey, in fact, could be called the last great modernist.

This compromise will make many people happy, as it fits the current ethos quite a bit. In my cynical moments, I would describe the main problem of modern philosophy as the following: how to establish enough certainty to rule out the truth claims of Christianity, but leave enough uncertainty to allow us to choose the pagan god and the nontraditional morality we want. Tauber's position allows him to do this: he can write that the Christians in the famous (or infamous) *Kitzmiller v. Dover* case obviously were wrong, and that President George W. Bush's evangelical morality clearly trespassed on the domain of science; at the same time he can embrace a spirituality that says we are one with nature, and which makes moral demands.

For this reason, Tauber's book will not help much in the larger wars of science and meaning. Tauber's view, which is not unique to him, basically adds the sphere of value, meaning, and religion onto the world of science as a type of veneer. Unlike positivism, which allows no input from this "upper sphere," the veneer view allows the upper sphere to tell science some things: interesting places to look, communal uses for scientific results, and generally larger concepts, such as "souls," "love," and "communities." However, the upper sphere never contradicts the fact claims of science: science provides the facts, and the upper sphere adapts to tell new stories about these facts.

I have heard this view expressed many times before, under various names such as complementarity, orthogonality, non-overlapping magisteria of authority, etc. Tauber takes it that Kant settled things once and for all when he proposed a similar view of the relation of science and religion in the eighteenth century. Science lies in one world, religion in another, and never the twain shall meet, except that religion can weave interesting stories about the results of science.

The problem is that not all religions fit into this scheme. Buddhism does, and many forms of pantheist or pagan spirituality do, and so does neo-orthodox Christianity (defined roughly as those who followed the

line of Kant, Kierkegaard, and Barth in adopting a non-overlapping approach to reason and faith). But some religions, notably historical Christianity, do not. Consider the following statements:

Five years ago, in New Jersey, a man was truly dead for three days and then came back to life.

Two thousand years ago, in Jerusalem, a man was truly dead for three days and then came back to life.

Do either of these lie in the domain of science? Both? If one does, and the other does not, does time delay alone make a story no longer in the domain of rational thinking about experience? It is clear that first-century Christians thought that they were telling a true story about the real world when they talked about the resurrection of Christ. They did not think that they were simply creating meaning and value as adjuncts to the generally agreed-upon business of secular life. And there have always been people since then who took the same approach, up to the present day, in the Orthodox, Catholic, and evangelical Protestant churches.

The relation between Christianity and science is one of the main points of tension in American culture, as Tauber notes. Yet on this battle front, he adds very little of help, with easy dismissals of evangelicals like Bush opposing stem cell research and Catholics like the Thomas More Institute who led the Dover proceedings. Some academics may snort that such truth claims deserve no serious attention, but this only underscores their isolation in the larger battle over science and meaning. The Science Wars which dominate the attention of Tauber's book made hardly a blip in the public consciousness. By contrast, the science wars of Dover and various textbook committees have made front page news, and are nowhere near resolution.

Academics I know seem surprised that issues of the actual truth of religious claims keep coming up. But these claims matter. Shall we tell Christians that no such man as Jesus rose from the dead? Shall we tell Muslims that Mohammed heard nothing? Shall we tell Mormons that there was never any Israelite tribe in North America? In the context of the larger wars of science and meaning, Tauber's prescription seems to be to do so, and to tell them to reformulate their religion into one of his choosing, in which religion makes no claims about the real world other than to use scientific facts to tell analogical stories. That is no small change in religion, for many people.

It seems to me that one lesson from postmodernism could be humility. Clearly, no one can think neutrally or objectively about the existence of a God who may judge us, so listening to the postmodern, we might distrust our own skepticism. If many intelligent and sane people

have testified that something miraculous actually happened, we may disagree, but we may also want to not dismiss their claims out of hand. If from these claims of intervention they conclude that they have a meaningful message from God that relates to morality, we may demur without mocking them for making an elementary category mistake, or using scare words as Tauber does, accusing them of “insinuating” their “ideology” and “doctrine” into the unchallengeable domain of science. After all, people claiming to create new ethics in the name of science, as Dewey wanted, have a long history of repudiation by later generations. It is easy now to be aghast at Mengele and the U.S. experiments on prisoners with syphilis, but many people draw the conclusion that they are seeing the same thing now when they look at the dismembered body parts of fetuses or monkeys whose brains have been experimented on. Is it so wrong for these people to question, like the postmodernist, the morality claims of science? Tauber gives us no path for resolving these difficult ethical conflicts, and seems to feel that even to consider ethical limits on scientific practice, as Bush did, is to tread illegally in the territory of science.

At the same time, humility would also say to those whose religions do allow for disagreement with scientists, that they can be skeptical of science claims but also can be skeptical about truth claims in the name of religion. Believing some claims of the miraculous does not require gullibility about all such claims.

But none of this is addressed by Tauber. His book is addressed at the “small” Science Wars, the debates among academics. As such, his work is a useful survey of the history of philosophy of science, drawing together the threads of Kant, Thoreau, Polanyi, Kuhn, etc. But it is hardly the final word in the larger debate.

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SUSAN L. CROCKIN and HOWARD W. JONES, Jr. *Legal Conceptions: The Evolving Law and Policy of Assisted Reproductive Technologies*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. \$55.

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As a historian interested in women’s sexual and reproductive health in the twentieth century, and in particular in the understudied area of infertility,